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PROCEDURES TO LESSEN REMITTITUR'S INTRUSION
ON THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
JURY TRIAL
I. INTRODUCTION
The remittitur procedure in the federal courts enables district court
judges' to offer plaintiffs who have received excessive jury awards the
choice of accepting a court-determined reduction in the awarded dam-
ages or submitting to a new trial on the claim.2 Traditionally, neither
plaintiffs nor defendants could appeal a judge's decision to invoke the
remittitur procedure,' but the expansion of appellate review in recent
decades has gradually led to changes in the availability of remittitur
appeals.
A defendant now can appeal the trial court's denial of either his re-
quest for a remittitur or his motion for a new trial.4 Even when the
I. Ordinarily, trial courts employ the remittitur procedure, but it is also available to appel-
late courts. The appellate remittitur is discussed at notes 77-81 infra and accompanying text.
2. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.21 (2d ed. 1977); 6A
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.05[3] (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 6A MOORE]; 11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
11 WRIGHT & MILLER]; Busch, Remititurs and Additurs in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death
Cases, 12 DEF. L.J. 521 (1963); Carlin, Remittiturs andldditurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1942); James,
Remediesfor Excessiveness or lnadequacr' of Verdicts.- New Trial on Some or.4l Issues, Remittitur
andAdditur, I DuQ. L. REV. 143 (1963); Note, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Remittitur Practice]; Note, Appealability of Judg-
ments Entered Pursuant to Remittiturs in Federal Courts, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1150 [hereinafter cited as
Appealability of Judgments]; Note, Remittitur Review. Constitutionality and Efficiency in Liquidated
and Unliquidated Damage Cases, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 376 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Remittitur
Review]; 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 845 (1976); 21 VA. L REv. 666 (1935); 44 YALE L.J. 318 (1934).
For a discussion of remittitur and additur (a judicial increase of award) in state courts, see
Busch, supra;, 3 CUM.-SAM. L. REv. 150 (1972); 22 Loy. L. REV. 846 (1976); 49 N.C.L. REV. 141
(1970); 24 TENN. L. REV. 115 (1957).
3. IT]he exercise of judicial discretion in denying a motion for a new trial, on the
ground that the verdict is too small or too large, is not subject to review on writ of error
or appeal.. . . This is but a special application of the more general rule that an appel-
late court will not reexamine the facts which induced the trial court to grant or deny a
new trial.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 489 (Stone, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted).
4. The following cases established a defendant's right to appellate review of the trial court's
dismissal of his motion for new trial or remittitur as a remedy for an excessive jury award: Bank-
ers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 307 F. 2d 418 (8th Cir. 1962); Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 289
F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961); Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955); Ballard v. Forbes, 208
F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1954); Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952); Trowbridge v. Abrasive
Co., 190 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1951); Smith v. Welch, 189 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1951); Sebring Trucking
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plaintiff chooses to accept the trial court's remittitur, a defendant can
petition an appellate court for a new trial5 or a larger remittitur.6
In contrast, the plaintiff's right to seek reinstatement of the jury ver-
dict from an appellate court is less clear. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Donovan v. Penn Shiping Co., 7 the Fifth Circuit had liber-
alized the traditional rule against remittitur appeals to permit a plain-
tiff, who accepts a remittitur "under protest" and refrains from
collecting the judgment, to request appellate review of the trial court's
remittitur order.8 The Sixth Circuit also had permitted a plaintiff to
appeal a remittitur order under a state law,9 which the court character-
ized as "substantive" and thus binding on the federal courts under the
Erie doctrine.'0 Other circuits, however, remained cautious in their
consideration of the Fifth Circuit practice" and uniformly criticized
Co. v. White, 187 F. 2d 486 (6th Cir. 1951); Boyle v. Bond, 187 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Virgin-
ian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948).
5. See notes 25-29 infra and accompanying text.
6. Id.
7. 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (per curiam).
8. The Fifth Circuit procedure is described at notes 85-97 infra and accompanying text. The
plaintiff must accept the remittitur to obtain a final order from which to appeal. See Remittitur
Review, supra note 2, at 377.
9. Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964). The court applied
the "outcome determinative" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), to a Tennes-
see statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-118 (1955), which authorized the appeal of remittiturs ac-
cepted under protest. See, e.g., Howard v. J.W. Zelner & Sons Transfer Co., 539 F.2d 245 (6th
Cir. 1976); Jones v. Wittenberg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976) (cross-appeal); Burnett v.
Coleman Co., 507 F. 2d 726 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973
(6th Cir. 1974); Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973). See generally Remiltitur
Review, supra note 2, at 378 n.ll; Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 318-19; ApFealability of
Judgments, supra note 2, at 1151-55.
10. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
II. The First Circuit in Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1975),
assumed that "an appeal lies from a consented-to remittitur," but did not consider plaintiff's right
to appeal because the district court had not abused its discretion in ordering the remittitur. Id at
94. The Second Circuit reviewed the Fifth Circuit's appeal procedure in Reinertsen v. George W.
Rogers Constr. Co., 519 F.2d 531 (2d. Cir 1975), but withheld its judgment until the issue was
directly before the court.
In the Third Circuit a district court allowed plaintiff to accept a remittitur "under protest,"
specifically leaving the validity of plaintiff's appeal to the appellate court. See Thomas v. E.J.
Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'don other grounds, 476 F.2d 471 (3d
Cir. 1973). Because the court of appeals reversed the remittitur on other grounds and remanded
the case for a new trial on all issues, it noted but did not settle the appeal issue.
The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit's remittitur appeal practice in Collum v.
Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970) (direct appeal). In Shor-line Rambler, Inc. v. American
Motors Sales Corp., 543 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1976), the court spoke favorably of the plaintiff's cross-
appeal of a remittitur accepted "under protest," but dismissed the appeal on the basis of prece-
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the Sixth Circuit's application of Erie.12
The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile this conflict among the
circuits in Donovan. In a per curiam opinion the Court reasoned that
the tradition established by four Supreme Court decisions at the turn of
the century13 precludes plaintiffs who accept remittiturs in lieu of new
trials from appealing remittitur orders. 4 The Court thus summarily
disposed of plaintiffs direct appeal for review of the remittitur he ac-
cepted under protest: "In order to clarify whatever uncertainty might
exist, we now reatrm the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal
court, whether prosecuting a state or federal cause of action, may not
appeal from a remittitur order he has accepted."' 5
The Donovan Court, however, did not give plenary consideration to
the constitutional and policy distinctions between direct and cross-ap-
peals of remittitur orders by plaintiffs. Several courts and commenta-
tors had distinguished the unacceptability of direct appeals from the
acceptability of plaintiff cross-appeals; 16 Le., appeals by a plaintiff
when the defendant already has sought appellate review of the trial
dent. Id at 606. For a discussion of the distinction between direct and cross-appeals, see note 16
supra and accompanying text.
The Eighth Circuit in Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v. Hahn, Inc., 480 F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1973), noted
that the trial court had allowed plaintiff to accept the remittitur under protest without prejudice to
its right to appeal, remanded the claim for a new trial, and thus did not reach the appealability
issue. Id at 491. In a subsequent personal injury case the Eighth Circuit refused to review plain-
tilf's remittitur appeal. See Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 491 F.2d 707 (8th Cir.), aff'd,
506 F. 2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975). After refusing the remittitur, the
court ordered a new trial solely on the damages issue. 506 F.2d at 506. This procedure offers an
economic advantage similar to a remittitur, it avoids a full second jury trial and enables both
parties to appeal the judge's order for abuse of discretion.
12. See, e.g., West v. Jutras, 456 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir. 1972); Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 382 F. 2d 73 (7th Cir. 1967); Karlson v. 305 East 43rd St. Corp., 370 F.2d 467 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 905 (1967). See also Jones v. Wittenberg Univ., 534 F. 2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976)
(McCree, J., dissenting).
13. Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Min-
ing Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895); Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22
(1889).
14. 429 U.S. at 649.
15. Id at 650.
16. In Shor-line Rambler, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 543 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1976),
the court dismissed plaintiffs cross-appeal but stated:
In our view there is much to be said for allowing an appeal by plaintiff following the
acceptance of a remittitur under protest, at least in the context of a cross-appeal. We
note in particular that in Dorin Y. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 382 F.2d 73
(7th Cir. 1967), Chief Judge Fairchild acknowledged his personal preference for such a
rule.
543 F.2d at 606. See also Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531, 534 n.3
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court's decision. Arguably, therefore, the Donovan decision does not
"clarify whatever uncertainty might exist" or provide clear guidance to
courts faced with plaintiff cross-appeals of remittiturs accepted under
protest. Nonetheless, lower court cases since Donovan have dismissed
cross-appeals, 7 despite the further advantage this grants to defendants
who now not only stand to gain the sole benefits that can be derived
from a remittitur or new trial, but also hold the exclusive right to ap-
peal an adverse determination on the issue.
This Note argues that the inherent unfairness to plaintiffs under the
current remittitur procedure calls for the exemption of cross-appeals
from the historical prohibition against plaintiff remittitur appeals. The
Note first examines the constitutionality of the federal courts' remittitur
procedure, then evaluates the methods presently available to mitigate
the procedure's intrusion on plaintiffs' seventh amendment right to jury
trial, and finally, sets forth a model for plaintiff cross-appeals and ana-
lyzes its suitability in light of the Donovan decision and other argu-
ments in opposition to plaintiff remittitur appeals.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REMITTITUR
The practice of remittitur in the federal courts originates from Justice
Story's 1822 circuit decision in Blunt v. Little.i After citing two Eng-
lish cases that granted the defendant's motion for a new trial based on
an excessive jury award, 9 Justice Story declared that the plaintiff could
remit part of the award rather than submit to a new trial.20 Although
Blunt acknowledged the threat to jury verdicts posed by remittitur or-
(2d Cir. 1975); F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 2, at 335-36; Remititur Practice, supra note 2,
at 324-25; 49 N.C.L. REV. 141 (1970).
17. See, e.g., Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 577 F. 2d 873 (5th Cir. 1978); Spectrofuge
Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 440 U.S. 939
(1979); Keene v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.
1978).
Significantly, however, when a defendant seeks a further reduction in the plaintiff's award
through an appellate remittitur after the plaintiff's acceptance of the remittitur, Donovan does not
preclude the plaintiff from arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion in ordering the remit-
titur. See Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 930 (1979). Donovan also does not preclude the plaintiff's appeal of other claims not
included within the accepted remittitur. Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
18. 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.A. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578).
19. Chambers v. Caufield, 6 East 244, citedin 3 F. Cas. at 761; Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Tawnt.
277, cited in 3 F. Cas. at 761.




ders, subsequent Supreme Court decisions relying on the case have
failed to analyze the constitutionality of the remittitur procedure.2'
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
22
Several courts and commentators have questioned whether the substi-
tution of a judge-determined award for the jury's verdict violates the
seventh amendment. 3 A strict historical interpretation of the amend-
ment would preclude any procedure that enabled a judge to reexamine
facts unless that procedure existed in English common law in 1791, the
year of incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Constitution.24 Be-
cause a judge necessarily reexamines facts to determine whether the
particular sum awarded by the jury in damages is excessive, the prac-
tice of remittitur arguably violates the seventh amendment.
The Supreme Court's sole consideration of the issue occurred nearly
forty-five years ago in Dimick v. Schiedt.25 The immediate issue before
the Dimick Court concerned the constitutionality of additur, a proce-
21. Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1896);
Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41 (1895); Clark v. Sidway, 142 U.S. 682
(1892); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (18 9); Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130
U.S. 69 (1889); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886).
For a description of the Supreme Court's avoidance of a direct ruling on the validity of this
procedure, see Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961); Remittitur Review,
supra note 2, at 381-85. The following Supreme Court cases assumed without deciding that the
seventh amendment does not preclude appellate review of the trial judge's denial of a motion to
set aside an award as excessive: Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955); Affolder v. New York,
C. & St. L.R.R., 339 U.S. 96 (1950); Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474
(1933).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
23. See, e.g., Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 512 F.2d 671, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1975) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing) ("The doctrine of remittitur rests on a constitutional base of
clay."); Carlin, supra note 2, at 14-24; Remittitur Review, supra note 2, at 386-91.
24. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396-407 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing for
a strict historical interpretation of the seventh amendment). See generally F. JAMEs & G. HAZ-
ARD, supra note 2, at §§ 8.1-8.3; 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11[2], [71, .16141 (2d ed.
1979); Blume, Review of Facts in fur)' Cases-The Seventh Amendment, 20 AM. JUD. Soc'Y 130
(1936); Hinton, Power of Federal Appellate Court to Review Ruling on Motionfor New Trial, 1 U.
CHI. L. REV. 111 (1933); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial. 4 Study in the Irrational-
it)' of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486 (1975) (arguing for a strict historical
interpretation to limit the use of civil juries). See also Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
25. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
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dure by which the trial judge increases the size of the jury award,26 but
the parallel between additur and remittitur led the Court to discuss the
constitutionality of each.27 The Court held that additur violates the
seventh amendment, 28 but gave begrudging approval in dicta to remit-
titur because of the length of time courts had practiced the procedure.29
Although the Court in Dimick felt compelled to uphold the constitu-
tionality of remittitur because of its longevity, the Court could not mar-
shal sufficient evidence of its common-law vitality in 1791 to support its
constitutionality on an historical theory.30 Justice Sutherland thus jus-
tified the Court's conclusion by distinguishing remittitur and additur in
terms of their respective effects on jury verdicts.3' In this much criti-
cized distinction,32 Justice Sutherland argued that a remittitur does not
intrude on the jury award because it represents a sum included within
the original verdict; the final additur award, in contrast, includes a sum
that the jury did not award in its verdict. This distinction is spurious;
a verdict, in contrast to a sum of money, may not be divided. A verdict
represents a specific sum in damages, and any deviation from the jury's
award-whether an addition or a subtraction--equally disregards the
26. See generally 6A MOORE, supra note 2, at 1 59.05[4] (2d ed. 1979); Carlin, supra note 2, at
24-29; Wilson, The Motonfor New Trial Based on inadequacy of Damages ,4warded, 39 NEa. L.
REv. 694 (1960) See also Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 536 (3d Cir. 1976)
(Rosenn, J., dissenting) (court, in effect, granted appellate additur), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825
(1977); Novak v. Gramm, 469 F.2d 430, 432-33 (8th Cir. 1972) (discussion and dismissal ofplain-
tiff's arguments for additur). But see McCoy v. Wean United, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 495 (E.D. Tenn.
1975) (court ordered additur of $110,000 plus medical expenses based on state law characterized
as substantive).
27. 293 U.S. at 482-88.
28. Id at 484-85. The lower federal courts that have passed on the constitutionality of remit-
titur have followed the Dimick dicta. See, e.g., Ehret Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d
280, 285 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973,
976 (6th Cir. 1974); Meyer v. W.R. Grace & Co., 421 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modl.
fed, 565 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977).
29. "[W]e may assume that in a case involving a remittitur, which this case does not, the
doctrine would not be reconsidered or disturbed at this late day." 293 U.S. at 485.
30. Id at 483-85.
31. Id at 485-87.
32. See id at 494 (Stone, J., dissenting); Carlin, supra note 2, at 17-18.
33. Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a remission of the excess
for a new trial is not without plausible support in the view that what remains is included
in the verdict along with the unlawful excess--in that sense that it has been found by the
jury-and that the remittitur has the effect of merely lopping off an excrescence. But
where the verdict is too small, an increase by the court is a bald addition of something
which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict.
293 U.S. at 486.
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jury's determination of the facts.34
Justice Sutherland's distinction also seems to be an attempt to em-
phasize the first clause of the seventh amendment, which provides that
"the right of trial by jury shall be preserved," but temporize the man-
date of the amendment's second clause that "no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwised reexamined. . . than according to the rules of the
common law." 35 This approach suggests that once a challenged proce-
dure satisfies the jury preservation clause of the amendment, less con-
stitutional concern needs to be focused on the historical test of the
second clause. In procedures other than remittitur, for example, courts
have liberalized the historical interpretation of the seventh amendment
to avoid limiting the development of modern procedural devices36 and
the expansion of the jury trial to new causes of action.37  If this ap-
34. Carlin, supra note 2, at 17-18; 21 VA. L. REv. 666 (1935). But see James, supra note 2, at
154-55.
35. See note 22 supra.
36. Examples of modem procedural devices alien to the common law of England in 1791, but
that necessarily involve a judicial reexamination of jury-determined facts, include the ability of a
trial judge to grant: a new trial, FED R. Civ. P. 59; a directed verdict, FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a);
summary judgment, FED. R. Civ. P. 56; and judgment n.o.v., FED. IR Civ. P. 50(b). For a discus-
sion of modem procedures that constitute reexaminations of jury-determined facts, see Melancon
v. McKeithan, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1045-48 (E.D. La. 1972), all'd, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973); James,
Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices 4vailable Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REV. 218
(1961).
37. Traditionally, when confronted with a statutorily based cause of action, a court generally
characterizes the action as either at law or in equity to determine whether the parties have a
seventh amendment right to jury trial. The court either analogizes the action in question to a
previously determined action or characterizes the action by the type of remedy sought. In this
context, a rigid historical interpretation would severely limit the expansion ofjury-trial availabil-
ity. See generally Redish, supra note 24; Wolfram, supra note 24.
Since the merger of the law and equity, the present seventh amendment approach is not clear.
Cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (collection of OSHA penalties); Pemell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (landlord-tenant disputes in District of Columbia); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (damage suits under Civil Rights Act of 1968); Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970) (stockholder derivative actions); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (bank-
ruptcy court); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (complex actions and masters);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (equitable cleanup doctrine). See gener-
al/v Kirst, Adminitrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court's Assault on the Seventh
Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1281 (1978). The Court clearly departed from the historical
analogue test in several of these cases to expand the use of the jury trial. In Beacon Theatres the
Court looked to the broad purposes of the seventh amendment to effectuate its goals in a modem
context. See generally McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial- A Study ofBeacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1967). In addition, there is some indication in
Ross that the Supreme Court might replace the historical test with one that balances the "practical
abilities and limitations ofjuries." 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. See generally Note, The Uncertain Future
of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE LJ. 112 (1971); 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 697 (1970).
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proach reflects the proper relationship between the two clauses of the
seventh amendment, then the historical test need not preclude the con-
stitutionality of remittitur appeals by plaintiffs.
In dissent Justice Stone spumed the distinction advanced by Justice
Sutherland, but agreed that the seventh amendment was never in-
tended to strap modem courts with eighteenth-century procedures;
rather, the amendment dictates only that courts "preserve the essen-
tials" of the common-law jury trial.38 This interpretation also blends
the second clause of the amendment into the first; thus, a judge may
constitutionally reexamine facts so long as he preserves the essence of
the jury trial.39
According to this interpretation, however, whether a court-offered
choice between remittitur and new trial preserves the essential seventh
amendment right to elect trial by jury depends directly on whether the
plaintiff's acceptance of a remittitur is freely made. Certainly, a court
that substitutes a sum of damages for the jury's award without granting
plaintiff's the option of a new trial unconstitutionally invades the prov-
ince of the jury.' Even the freedom of choice meaningfully available
38. There is nothing in its history or language to suggest that the Amendment had any
purpose but to preserve tfie essentials of the jury trial as it was known to the common law
before the adoption of the Constitution. For that reason this Court has often refused to
construe it as intended to perpetuate in changeless form the minutiae of trial practice as it
existed in the English courts in 1791. From the beginning, its language has been re-
garded as but subservient to the single purpose of the Amendment, to preserve the essen-
tials of the jury trial in actions at law, serving to distinguish them from suits in equity
and admiralty, see Parson v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 446, and to safeguard the jury's function
from any encroachment which the common law did not permit.
Thus interpreted, the Seventh Amendment guarantees that suitors in actions at law
shall have the benefits of trial of issues of fact by a jury, but it does not prescribe any
particular procedure by which these benefits shall be obtained, or forbid any which does
not curtail the function of the jury to decide questions of fact as it did before the adop-
tion of Amendment. It does not restrict the court's control of the jury's verdict, as it had
previously been exercised, and it does not confine the trial judge, in determining what
issues are for the jury and what for the court, to the particular forms of trial practice in
vogue in 1791.
293 U.S. at 490-91 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) citedin Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d
797, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1961). See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943) (seventh
amendment does not bind courts to exact common-law procedures); Henderson, The Background
of the Seventh Amendaent, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966) (seventh amendment not intended to
codify rigid form of jury practice).
39. See 293 U.S. at 492.
40. See Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889); Staplin v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 519
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff's appeal allowed because trial judge reduced award without
plaintiff's consent); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973, 976 (6th Cir. 1974) ("The district court
cannot, without the consent of the parties, substitute its judgment for that of the jury on the issue
ofjust compensation. To permit the Court to do so would erode the parties' Seventh Amendment
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to a plaintiff who is granted the option, however, is only apparent, not
real.4 Under the traditional procedure, the plaintiff who wishes to
contest a remittitur order must first undergo the delay and expense of a
second trial to obtain a final judgment from which to appeal.42 If the
second jury verdict is significantly smaller than the first, the plaintiff
may then move for a new trial.43 If the trial court denies the motion,
the plaintiff finally acquires the right to appellate review of the trial
court's action, but even then the scope of review is limited to whether
the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the remittitur after the
first trial or denying plaintiffs motion for a new trial.' In light of the
uncertainty, delay, and expense inherent in this procedure, the accept-
ance by a plaintiff of a remittitur over a new trial represents the product
of a subtle, but effective, coercion. The unfairness-if not unconstitu-
guarantee of a jury trial." (citations omitted)); Stewart v. Atlantic Pipe Line Co., 470 F.2d 738
(5th Cir. 1972), modfied, 479 F. 2d 311 (5th Cir. 1973).
41. When a remittitur is used, however, the coercive effect upon a plaintiff is very great.
He is offered a reduced verdict right away. Should he refuse, in order to regain the full
amount of the verdict he must first undergo the delay and trouble of a sedond trial,
perhaps obtain a lower verdict, and then try to persuade an appellate court that the trial
judge erred in reducing the first verdict. It should be no surprise that, as the majority
puts it, "most plaintiffs now accept the remittitur thus necessitating a second trial in only
a small minority of cases." If this is so, it proves appellant's point, which is that the
present system deprives him of any real opportunity to challenge the judge's use of a
remittitur.
• ..Why should we allow a plaintiff to be coerced into giving up his chance to chal-
lenge an alleged invasion of the jury's prerogative?
Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1976) (Feinberg, J., dissenting), aff'd,
429 U.S. 648 (1977). See generally Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 311-13.
42. See, e.g., Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975);
Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931
(1975).
43. See, e.g., Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975).
Where the quantum of the plaintiff's second trial award is similar to that of the first award, the
trial judge can again declare the verdict excessive and require the plaintiff to choose again be-
tween a remittitur or a new (third) trial. In theory, the trial judge could continue to order new
trials until either plaintiff accepted remittitur or a lower verdict is reached. See Donovan v. Penn
Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 536, 539 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976) (Feinberg, J., dissenting), a 'd, 429 U.S. 648
(1977); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Some courts assert that
when the first award is excessive as a matter of law, a second jury award of a comparable sum also
should be struck as excessive as a matter of law. See, e.g.,Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289,296 n.15
(3d Cir. 1971) (dictum). But see 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2815 at 105 n.8.
44. See, e.g., Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975);
Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931
(1975).
Appellate courts will grant less deference to trial courts, however, when the trial judge's order
conflicts with the jury's verdict. Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 147-49 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969).
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tionality--of this procedure calls for the recognition of plaintiff remitti-
tur appeals.
Courts also circumvent the constitutional rule against reexamination
of jury-determined facts by characterizing their actions as the review of
law rather than of fact. 5 Courts thus frequently state that remittitur is
required because the jury's verdict is excessive as "a matter of law."46
Clearly, however, any change in a jury verdict entails a reexamination
of facts upon which the jury justified its award, and thus necessarily
results in some degree of intrusion upon the jury's verdict.47 Further-
more, there is no readily identifiable point at which a remittitur order
constitutes a review of law rather than of fact. The ambiguity of this
distinction only makes it easier for courts mistrustful of juries to ration-
alize decisions actually based on a policy preference for greater control
over jury verdicts.48
The .Dimick Court's affirmation of remittitur4 9 the availability of re-
mittitur appeal to defendants but not plaintiffs,5 0 and the manner in
which the remittitur procedure coerces plaintiffs or leaves them open to
45. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1045-46 (E.D. La. 1972). See also
Blume, supra note 24.
46. See, e.g., Community Television Serv., Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 214, 218
(D.S.D. 1977) ("the court finds the verdict excessive as a matter of law"); Treadway Companies,
Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F. Supp. 316, 326 (D.N.J. 1973) (new trial or remittitur ordered in
Clayton Act suit as jury's award was excessive as a matter of law).
47. Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972).
Although the determination whether to grant a new trial for this reason is often denomi-
nated a "question of law", it must necessarily involve a reassessment of facts. So too,
when a trial court grants a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ... on the
basis of insufficiency of the evidence. . ., it must necessarily involve re-examination of
facts despite the "legal" nature of the question presented. Further, when an appellate
court grants a motion for a jury trial... it is technically issuing a delayed ruling on a
motion for directed verdict; yet the ruling must necessarily involve fact re-examination.
Id at 1046.
48. For criticism of the civil jury trial, see J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (Princeton ed. 1973);
L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should be Abolished, 60
A.B.A.J. 570 (1974); Green, Juries and Justice-The Jury's Role in Personal Injur Cases, 1962 U.
ILL. L.F. 152; Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay ofJustice, 56 A.B.A. J. 950 (1970); Redish, supra
note 24, at 502-08; Stewer, The Case Against the Jury (4 Brief Without Citations), 47 N.Y.S.B.J.
101 (1975).
For support of the civil jury trial, see Kalvin, The Dignity of the CivilJury, 50 VA. L, REV. 1055
(1964). See also Kirst, supra note 37; Shaffer, Judges, Repulsive Evidence and the Abiliy to Re-
spond, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 503 (1968); Wolfram, supra note 37; Wright, The Invasion of the
Jury.- Temperature ofthe War, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 137 (1953); Wright, Instructions to the Jury: Sum-
mary tahout Comment, 1954 WAsH. U.L.Q. 177.
49. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.




judicial manipulation, all decidedly tip the balance of fairness in favor
of defendants to the detriment of plaintiffs, who lose jury awards. This
intrusion on the jury function requires the adoption of methods to miti-
gate the unconstitutional impact of the current remittitur practice in the
federal courts.
III. METHODS TO MITIGATE REMITTITUR'S INTRUSION ON JURY
VERDICTS
Among the methods presently employed to lessen the inequitable im-
pact of remittitur on plaintiffs, four deserve particular attention for
their promise, yet limited utility or desirability.
One means to control abuse of remittitur is for courts to adopt a
uniform and strict standard for determining when a jury award is ex-
cessive and thus justifies usage of the remittitur procedure. Unfortu-
nately, present standards vary greatly5' because determinations of
excessiveness are left to trial judges52 whom appellate courts will re-
verse only for abuse of discretion.53 One standard requires that the
excessiveness of the jury's verdict "shock the judicial conscience,"54 or
"[repel] the trial judge's concept of justice and reason"; 5 another stan-
dard requires only that the verdict lack support of "substantial evi-
dence."56
Further divisions occur out of reliance on the judge's perception of
the extent to which the jury's "passion or prejudice" manifested itself in
51. See generally Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 302-04.
52. 6A MOORE, supra note 2, at 59.05[3].
53. The appellate standard of review for the grant or denial of a new trial or remittitur mo-
tion is abuse of discretion. See notes 44 supra and 78-79 infra and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505, 507 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974)
("grossly and shockingly excessive"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); Brents v. Freeman's Oil
Field Serv., Inc., 448 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1971) ("the verdict is not unsupported by the evidence
and contrary to all reason ... nor is it so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court");
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 337-38 (D.N.J. 1975) ("shocking to the
judicial conscience or so grossly inadequate as to constitute a miscarriage of justice"), vacated and
remanded, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Collum v. Butler, 288 F.
Supp. 918, 920 (N.D. Ill. 1968) ("shocks the judicial conscience"), a f'd, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir.
1970).
55. See, e.g., Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 148-49 (D.C. Cir.) (miscar-
riage of justice or beyond maximum reasonable range), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969); Fratelli
Gardino, S.p.A., v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 447 F. Supp. 1337, 1343-44 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (justice in
each case), modfied, 587 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1979).
56. See, e.g., Shipe v. Leavesley Indus., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 190, 192 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Knight v.
Nurseryman Supply, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 925, 926 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
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the verdict." When the jury's emotion may have affected the jury's
judgment of the defendant's liability, the circuits generally require a
new trial rather than a remittitur,58 but when the prejudice seems to
have influenced only the amount of damages awarded by the jury, the
circuits conflict over whether a new trial, or a new trial solely on the
damages issue, or a remittitur, should be granted. 9 This conflict exists
even though the Supreme Court has held that jury emotionalism is not
grounds for trial de novo.6 °
A related method to limit the extent to which the practice of remitti-
tur thwarts the jury's will and skirts the bounds of unconstitutionality
concerns the standards employed by trial judges to determine the
amount a plaintiff must remit to avoid a new trial.6 ' Courts generally
employ one of three standards. Under the "minimum recovery" rule,
judges offer plaintiffs the lowest sum that a reasonable jury could have
awarded.62 Judges who prefer a standard somewhat less unfavorable to
57. See, e.g., Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (6th Cir. 1978) (enlarge-
ment of photographs without distortion not prejudicial); Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 577
F.2d 873, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1978) (neither brief jury discussion of case prior to deliberation nor
verdict reached within fifteen minutes indicated passion or prejudice); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson
Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1046 (5th Cir. 1970) (presence of facially disfigured plaintiff at trial
evoked prejudice), modfed, 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921, rehearing denied,
409 U.S. 899 (1972).
Some courts assert that the excessiveness of the verdict alone indicates passion or prejudice.
See, e.g., Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aj'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1962); Community Television Serv. Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 435
F. Supp. 214 (D.S.D. 1977) (dictum). See also Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Scaly, Inc., 585
F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978) (trial judge's determination of "prejudice" based on "shocking" verdict
dismissed because jury's award was lower than that supportable by the evidence and judge's shock
was at treble damage requirement).
58. See, e.g., Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1975). See
also 6A MoorE, supra note 2, at 59.05[3].
59. See, eg., Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520 (1931) (remittitur
overturned because jury bias requires full new trial); Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518
F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1975) (remittitur allowed); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 511 F.2d 839, 846 (4th Cir. 1975) (second trial limited to damages proper when "liabil-
ity and damage issues are [not] inextricably interwoven"); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 307
F.2d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 1962) (court offered remittitur of exemplary damages or new trial on all
issues when prejudice affected exemplary but not compensatory damages).
60. See Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520 (1931). Cf. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 161 (1967) (prejudice determined solely from excessiveness
of award).
61. See generally Remittiur Practice, supra note 2, at 307-09.
62. See, e.g., Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Remtill-
tur Practie, su~pra note 2, at 308 nn.62-65 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs grant that award which a "proper functioning jury" should
have awarded.63 The Fifth Circuit applies yet a third remittitur stan-
dard by which judges award the maximum amount that a reasonable
jury could have awarded.64 The "maximum recovery rule" is based on
the view that the jury, by the excessiveness of its award, intended to
grant plaintiff the largest possible sum in damages.65
Of the three standards, the maximum recovery rule most favors
plaintiffs and least violates the integrity of jury verdicts because its ap-
plication least reduces the jury's award. The Fifth Circuit devised the
rule out of concern for plaintiffs' seventh amendment rights,66 and
other courts have adopted it for the protection it affords jury verdicts.67
The maximum recovery rule, however, also imposes greater hard-
63. 6A MOORE, supra note 2, at 59.05[3]; see, e.g.,Lanfronconi v. Tidewater Oil Co., 376
F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 951 (1967); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
64, Application of the Fifth Circuit maximum recovery rule entails a two-step process. The
appellate court must first decide whether the trial court should have interfered with the jury's
determination of damages; ie., if the "quantum of damages found by the jury was clearly within
'the maximum limit of a reasonable range."' Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d
1033, 1046 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 149 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969)), modified, 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
921, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972). The court then determines whether the remittitur is
"the amount which, under the evidence in the case, was the maximum that the jury reasonably
could find to be compensatory for appellant's loss." 456 F.2d at 181. See, e.g., Bonura v. Sea
Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 512 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975);
Jenkins v. Aquatic Contractors & Eng'rs, 446 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally Remittitur
Review, supra note 2, at 392-97.
The Fifth Circuit standard makes it difficult for plaintiffs to contend that the remittitur should
be increased, because it presumes that the trial judge reduced the verdict to the maximum award;
thus, the burden is on the plaintiff to "point to credible evidence which would support a greater
recovery." Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 512
F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975). This presumption has been criticized as inequitable to the plaintiff.
Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 512 F.2d 671, 671-73 (5th Cir. 1975) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(denial of rehearing). See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text.
The Fifth Circuit does not use the maximum recovery standard to calculate remittiturs from
punitive damage awards. See, e.g., Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th
Cir. 1975); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), aft'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1966).
65. 6A MOORE, supra note 2, at 59.05[3]; Remittitur Practice, Supra note 2, at 307-08.
66. See Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing denied,
512 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975). The use of the "maximum reasonable recovery" rule to review trial
court denials of new trial or remittitur motions also protects the plaintiffs seventh amendment
rights by limiting the scope of appellate interference with jury awards.
67. See, e.g., Howard v. J.N. Zelner & Sons Transfer Co., 529 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1976);
Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 506 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931
(1975); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1974); Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127
(6th Cir. 1973); Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
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ships on defendants than the other rules.68 The defendant who appeals
for a larger reduction in the remittitur, or for a new trial, must demon-
strate that the post-remittitur award not only exceeds a "reasonable"
award, but also oversteps the "maximum reasonable" award. The
maximum recovery rule also may harshly treat defendants when the
excessive verdict results not from the jury's intention to award plaintiff
the maximum sum, but from the effect of some neutral factor such as
the jury's misinterpretation of a jury instruction.69
Courts may also mitigate the inequities in the present remittitur pro-
cedure through confinement of its use to liquidated damages cases.70 A
jury verdict may be excessive, for example, solely because the jury mis-
applied a legal principle to the facts of the case, such as the miscalcula-
tion of a contractual formula.71 Recalculation of liquidated damages
in this example essentially entails nothing more than the proper selec-
tion or application of the formula, which is a matter of law. Because
the seventh amendment prohibits only the reexamination of jury-deter-
mined facts,72 the court's recalculation of liquidated damages does not
intrude upon the jury's constitutional province. In contrast, the deter-
mination of unliquidated damages, such as compensation for pain and
suffering, does not rely on legal formula; rather, the award depends on
subjective evaluations of fact, which is the function of the jury. In de-
termining whether to grant a remittitur or a retrial on damages, there-
fore, judges should consider the extent to which the jury's award is
based on readily calculable injury rather than on intangible factors."
U.S. 835 (1969); Schottka v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
68. See Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 307. Because the protections of the seventh
amendment extend to defendants and plaintiffs alike, a defendant may complain that the final
award does not approximate what a properly functioning jury would assess.
69. See, e.g., Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1978) (after trial judge
used remittitur following improper instruction that included "mental distress" as compensatory
damage factor, appellate court corrected remittitur to reduce award to lowest sum defendant's
evidence would support).
70. See generally Remititur Review, supra note 2, at 389-91; Remittitur Practice, supra note 2,
at 305-06.
71. See, e.g., Alover Distrib., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 513 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (action on
contract); Fratelli Gardino, S.p.A. v. Caribbean Lumber Co., 447 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D. Ga. 1978)
(action on contract); Community Television Serv., Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 214
(D.S.D. 1977) (valuation of collapsed tower); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 418
F. Supp. 1009 (D.NJ. 1976) (antitrust action), rev'd, 570 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1977).
72. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.




When the award is substantially unliquidated, retrial is preferable to
remittitur.74
The Supreme Court has not as yet adopted this distinction between
remittiturs in liquidated and unliquidated damages cases.75 Other
courts and commentators, however, have further differentiated the two
types of cases to assert that a court may simply substitute its recalcu-
lated award, without offering the plaintiff a choice of remittitur or new
trial, when the damages are clearly ascertainable and no factual deter-
minations are necessary.76 Ironically, this procedure may be more ben-
eficial to plaintiffs than the "voluntary" choice of remittitur or new trial
offered under the present system because of plaintiffs' inability to ap-
peal remittitur orders. The danger, however, in allowing courts to re-
calculate and substitute awards without plaintiffs' consent is that courts
may expand the practice to cases that do entail factual determina-
tions.77
A final means to alleviate the adverse effects of the remittitur proce-
dure on the jury function is to limit the use of appellate remittiturs.
Reexamination of jury-determined facts is likely to occur whether the
trial court or the appellate court first considers remittitur, but appellate
74. Although punitive damages are unliquidated and fall within the expertise of the jury,
some courts assert that both trial and appellate courts should exercise greater control over punitive
damage awards. See, e.g., Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19, 34-35 (2d Cir.
1976); cf. Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1975) (the standard to
determine a remittitur for punitive damages is not the "maximum" standard used with compensa-
tory damages). Under the majority rule the trial judge will apply the same standard of review for
both punitive and compensatory awards, if not grant greater deference to the jury in reviewing
punitive damages. See, e.g., Doralee Estates, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 569 F. 2d 716 (2d Cir.
1977) ("shockingly or grossly excessive"); Lanfranconi v. Tidewater Oil Co., 376 F.2d 91, 94-98
(2d Cir.) ("manifestly and grossly excessive"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 951 (1967); Bankers Life &
Cas. Co. v. Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1962) ("at least as narrow as that applied to compensa-
tory damage situations").
75. In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), Justice Sutherland noted that under English
common law the judge's alteration of a jury award depended upon whether the damages were
liquidated or unliquidated, but he did not suggest that the use of remittitur or additur should be
dependent upon this distinction.
76. See, e.g., 6A MOORE, supra note 2, at 59.05[3]; A. SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCE-
DURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 142 (1922). See also Staplin v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 519 F.2d 969,
973 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum).
77. See, e.g., Staplin v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 519 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1975) (appellate
court reinstated jury award for lost wages because trial judge's method for calculation of lost
wages had not been communicated to the jury as the required method). See also Baughman v.
Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 535-36 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting) (ma-
jority remolded jury award and granted additur, method of calculating damages disputed), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
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review constitutes a more remote reexamination, which commentators
criticize as an even greater intrusion upon the seventh amendment right
to trial by jury.7" Moreover, when a jury finds a particular quantum of
damages and the trial judge refuses defendant's request for remittitur
or new trial, an appellate court should not grant a remittitur order. The
trial judge's "opportunity to observe the witnesses and to consider the
evidence in the context of a living trial rather than upon a cold record
. . . [reinforces] the jury's determination of such matters of fact as the
weight of the evidence and the quantum of damages."7 9 On the other
hand, an appellate remittitur is more acceptable when the trial judge
disagrees with the jury's award and grants a remittitur, because the ap-
pellate remittitur essentially changes only the amount to be remitted
from an award that already has been judicially recognized as excessive.
Even with this limitation on the use of appellate remittiturs, how-
ever, the right to appeal the trial court's determination on the issue
vests solely in defendants under the present doctrine.80 Even when de-
fendants raise appeals, plaintiffs may not file cross-appeals." Like the
other three methods discussed above, therefore, the use of appellate re-
mittitur does not obviate the fundamental inequity in the present sys-
tem-the unavailability to plaintiffs of some means of remittitur
appeal.
IV. PLAINTIFF REMITTITUR APPEALS
8 2
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Donovan v. Penn Shivping
Co.,3 remittitur appeals by plaintiffs offered an appropriate counter-
balance to remittitur and remittitur appeals by defendants. Limited to
78. See, e.g., Busch, supra note 2, at 550; Huldverson, Remitatur and Other Things, 28 J. Mo.
B. 81 (1972) (regarding state practice); Remittitur Review, supra note 2, at 397-99 (favoring new
trial orders in unliquidated damage cases); Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 3 10-11 ("[a] jury
verdict becomes a tenuous thing when cloistered appellate judges feel free to tamper with it"). See
also Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience af4ppellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1957). Out see
33 Mo. L. REv. 637, 644 (1968). See also Carrington, The Pawer af District Judges andthe Respon-
sibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REv. 507 (1969).
79. Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir.) (in the context of the
standard of review of trial judge's remittitur-new trial order after second trial), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 835 (1969).
80. See notes 4-7, 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
82. See generally Remittitur Review, supra note 2, at 378-81; Remittitur Practice, supra note 2,
at 315-18.




its facts, Donovan precludes only direct appeals of remittitur orders by
plaintiffs. Only through the Court's sweeping dicta are plaintiff cross-
appeals foreclosed. 4 This part of the Note describes the plaintiff remit-
titur appeal procedure and analyzes the Donovan decision and other
arguments against plaintiff cross-appeals.
The Fifth Circuit pioneered the use of plaintiffs remittitur appeal.
The circuit's first indication that it would allow plaintiffs to appeal ap-
peared in its 1963 decision of Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott. 5 The
court in this case asserted in dicta that a plaintiff who accepts a remitti-
tur, but who has not collected the judgment, might be able to challenge
the remittitur order.8 6 The court formally adopted a remittur appeal
procedure three years later in Steinberg v. Indemnity Insurance Com-
pany of North America. 7
To successfully challenge a trial judge's remittitur order on either
direct appeal88 or cross-appeal,8 9 the Fifth Circuit procedure first re-
quires a plaintiff to accept the remittitur "under protest" 90 and to re-
frain from collecting on the judgment.91 This requirement serves to
protect defendants from detrimental reliance on the remittitur. The
plaintiff then must establish that the trial judge abused his discretion in
concluding that the verdict was excessive. An abuse of discretion oc-
84. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
85. 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), rehearing denied, 325 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 905 (1964).
86. 322 F.2d at 14.
87. 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966).
88. See. e.g., Gilbert v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 514 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1975); Gorsal-
itz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), modoed, 456 F.2d 180 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 899 (1972).
89. See, e.g., Turner v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., 546 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Bonura v. Sea Land
Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 512 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Simmons
v. King, 478 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 910 (5th
Cir. 1970).
90. See Minerals & Chemicals Phillips Corp. v. Milwhite Co., 414 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir.
1969) (plaintiffs cross-appeal dismissed because plaintiff had failed to accept remittitur "under
protest").
91. In Delta Eng'r Corp. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), the court indicated in dictum
that a plaintiff would not be able to appeal a remittitur if "the fruits of a judgment" were accepted.
Id at 15. In allowing the plaintifls remittitur appeal in Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 364 F.2d
266 (5th Cir. 1966), the court noted that "[m]oreover plaintiff has not collected the judgment as
reduced." Id at 268. Although in United States v. 1160.96 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 910 (5th Cir.
1970), the court noted that plaintiffs' acceptance of their judgment was appropriate in an eminent
domain action to avoid depriving them of both the use of their land and their judgment. Id at
912-13.
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curs if "the jury's original verdict was clearly within the universe of
possible awards which are supported by the evidence." 92 If unsuccess-
ful in this assertion, the plaintiff may still argue that the amount of the
award remaining after the remittitur exceeds the maximum award that
the evidence could support. 93 This argument, however, requires the
plaintiff to overcome a presumption that the trial court's award was
proper.94
Although this burden discourages frivolous appeals, it also limits the
effectiveness of the appeal procedure in mitigating the negative impact
of remittitur on plaintiffs.95 The trial judge should be required to sub-
stantiate his award by "making findings of fact and explicating the the-
ory or rationale for the damages."96 This modification of the Fifth
Circuit procedure would provide an "explicit foundation for the trial
judge's action, allowing a basis for appellate review in this constitution-
ally sensitive area." 97
The primary objection to this procedure is the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Donovan v. Penn Shioping Co., in which the Court asserted that
a "line of decisions stretching back to 1889 has firmly established that a
plaintiff cannot appeal the propriety of a remittitur order to which he
has agreed."98 Donovan, however, lacks the analysis necessary to sup-
port its summary rejectidn of any system for plaintiff remittitur appeals.
Initially, the Donovan Court misplaces its reliance on precedent.99 In
92. Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original),
rehearing denied, 512 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1975). For a further discussion of the "maximum recov-
ery" standard, see notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text.
93. Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 512 F.2d
671 (5th Cir. 1975).
94. IT]he appellate court must determine whether the amount of the award which re-
mains after the remittitur reflects the maximum award which the evidence will support
or whether it merely represents the trial court's opinion of what the proper award should
have been. At this point deference will be given to the trial court's determination since
he, and not the appellate court, was present during the ebb and flow of the trial, and it
will be presumed that the amount which he has chosen is the amount which will reduce
the jury's verdict to the "maximum possible" award unless the party opposed to the
remittitur can point to credible evidence which would support a greater recovery.
Id at 670.
95. Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 512 F.2d 671, 671-73 (5th Cir. 1975) (Goldberg, J., dis-
senting) (denial of rehearing).
96. Id at 673.
97. Id
98. 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977).
99. For more detailed discussions of the precedential value of the early Supreme Court deci-
sions, see Remittitur Review, supra note 2, at 377-78; Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 313-15;




Kennon v. Gilmer,'I for example, the Court upheld remittiturs in gen-
eral as "voluntary," but permitted plaintiff to appeal in this instance
because the trial court imposed the remittitur without offering plaintiff
the choice of a new trial." 1 As discussed earlier, however, the "volun-
tary" nature of a remittitur procedure that does not permit plaintiff ap-
peals is only apparent, not real.'0 2 Lewis v. Wilson'0 3 also may be
distinguished on the ground that plaintiff did not attempt to appeal
until two years after he signed a statement acknowledging his satisfac-
tion with the remittitur.'"
The Donovan Court's reliance on precedent also fails to recognize
that these early cases were decided before defendants could appeal trial
court denials of requests for remittitur or motions for new trial.0 5 The
significant procedural advantage to defendants resulting from this
change in remittitur law threatens to undermine the fundamental fair-
ness of current remittitur doctrine."
Most notably, the Donovan Court failed to give plenary considera-
tion to the distinctions between direct appeals and cross-appeals by
plaintiffs. The arguments against a system of plaintiff remittitur ap-
peals are more applicable to direct appeals than to cross-appeals. Crit-
ics of remittitur appeal argue that appellate review of lower court
decisions increases the likelihood of judicial reexamination of jury-de-
termined facts in violation of the seventh amendment.10 7 When a
plaintiff's appeal is in response to the defendant's appeal, however, the
increment of fact reexamination attributable to plaintiff's cross-appeal
is minimal. Another argument that applies less convincingly to cross-
appeals than to direct appeals is that plaintiff remittitur appeals would
increase the judicial workload.' Because the defendant initiates any
100. 131 U.S. 22 (1889).
101. Id at 30.
102. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
103. 151 U.S. 551 (1894).
104. Id. at 554.
105. See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
108. A plaintiff would have nothing to lose by accepting a remittitur "under protest,"
thereby guaranteeing himself a minimum verdict, and then proceeding to the court of
appeals in an effort to restore the sum which had been disallowed by the district judge.
The proliferation of appeals would be the inevitable consequence.
Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 536 F.2d 536, 537 (2d Cir. 1976), affTd, 429 U.S. 648 (1977). See
general), Remittitur Practice, supra note 2, at 321-24; Appealabiliy of Judgments, supra note 2, at
1161-62.
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appeal, however, the plaintiff does not create an additional administra-
tive burden through a cross-appeal. Furthermore, plaintiff cross-ap-
peals may improve judicial economy. The threat to defendants that the
appellate court may increase the plaintiff's award in response to plain-
tiffis cross-appeal might diminish the number of frivolous appeals by
defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's summary rejection of plaintiff remittitur ap-
peals in Donovan inadequately disposes of an important constitutional
issue. Neither the precedent relied upon by the Court nor the sweeping
language interpreted by lower courts to apply to both direct and cross-
appeals justifies the unavailability to plaintiffs of a procedure for remit-
titur appeals.
Plaintiff cross-appeals advance two significant goals: judicial econ-
omy and a balance between the plaintifis right to a jury-determined
award and the defendant's right to a fair verdict. The latter objective,
in particular, calls for the incorporation of cross-appeals into remittitur
practice to limit the arguably unconstitutional features that presently
exist in federal remittitur law.
William H. Wagner
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